In this article we seek to assess the significance of what we term 'cultural trust' in relation to wrongful convictions in England and Wales and the Netherlands, in the light of the adversarial and inquisitorial procedural traditions which still underpin criminal process in the two countries.
Introduction: wrongful convictions, procedural traditions and cultural trust
In this article we seek to assess the significance of what we term 'cultural trust' in relation to wrongful convictions in England and Wales and the Netherlands, in the light of the adversarial and inquisitorial procedural traditions which still underpin criminal process in the two countries.
International surveys identify many similarities across jurisdictions from both traditions in the direct causes of miscarriages of justice: abuse of power, mistaken eyewitnesses, dubious or misunderstood expert evidence and diverse professional failures by judges, defence lawyers, police and/or prosecutors (Huff and Killias 2008, 2013) . More broadly, there is evidence of the effect of the general psychological phenomenon, also well-known from experimental research, confirmation bias or tunnel vision. This suggests that information is filtered through an established lens. Where we have a pre-existing view about the facts (for example a suspect's guilt) we do not deal symmetrically with subsequent information. We tend to seek to confirm our pre-existing hypothesis and have difficulty in 'seeing' -or seeing the significance of -facts pointing to alternative explanations (Brants 2013: 163-6) . This has been a key factor in the story behind miscarriages of justice in many jurisdictions.
While there are clearly many similarities in the particular underlying causes of wrongful convictions and in general psychological effects in play, a comparative study focussed on procedural traditions can nevertheless be fruitful. Jurisdictions from the adversarial and inquisitorial traditions differ significantly in the guarantees that each offers against wrongful conviction in terms of expectations in professional conduct, in ways of assessing and responding to potentially misleading and problematic evidence, and thus also in the definition of the roles and relationships of professional actors. These key differences are linked to different underlying theories as to how facts and truth are to be found.
Sometimes these concepts of truth-finding -or at least elements of them -are explicitly stated in policy documents and legislation.
1 But often they are set out, if at all, only in fragmented or incomplete terms and have to be at least partly constructed by identifying the underlying assumptions of the particular procedural tradition.
For jurisdictions primarily influenced by the inquisitorial tradition, the emphasis has been on the active truth-finding judge and the dossier.
Thus in the Netherlands, a thorough investigation supervised by an impartial prosecutor 2 with the resulting evidence both for and against guilt recorded in an official file, is assumed to provide an active factfinding judge with the capacity to find truth at trial. Within the adversarial tradition in England and Wales, autonomous party rights to collect the evidence that suits their case are said to provide a basis for strong defence narrative building and the opportunity to effectively challenge prosecution witnesses at trial through cross-examination. This allows the equality of arms in argument at trial upon which accurate adversarial fact-finding is thought to depend.
But because such underlying assumptions are linked to a particular procedural tradition they have accumulated normative weight over time.
As H Patrick Glenn has put it (2010: 17):
'That which has been captured from the past is inherently normative; it provides present lessons as to how we should act…The 11 For example, Art 81, French CCP on the duties of the examining magistrate to seek out both exculpatory and inculpatory evidence. It may seem counterintuitive to emphasize trust as potentially dangerous, because it is generally seen as a positive, indeed essential, element in social relations in that it both expresses and reflects stability in mutual expectations. Rasmus Wandall argues (2015: 285-6 ) that from a functional point of view, trust can be described as a remedy for the inevitable uncertainty of social life -of what to expect from other people, groups, institutions, or from whole systems. But we also talk about 'taking something on trust' to identify a situation where we assume something to be true without (sufficient) evidence. And in criminal matters abusing trust leads to aggravated sentences exactly because it exploits vulnerability, often a vulnerability generated by established expectations of a person or a role (Ashworth 2015: 173) . In what follows, we will set out a general account of the relationship between truth-finding and the adversarial and inquisitorial procedural traditions before examining first England and Wales and then the Netherlands. We will seek to identify points within each jurisdiction where cultural trust is placed in the capacity of particular roles and relationships to ensure that the innocent are not convicted. But we will also argue that wrongful convictions in both jurisdictions demonstrate that these underlying assumptions may not correspond to realities on the ground. In a final section we will show how even the response to wrongful convictions, both individually and in terms of institutional reform, remains profoundly shaped (and indeed limited) by established procedural traditions.
Truth-finding and procedural traditions
Modern social theory has challenged the notion that there is an objective reality out there waiting to be found, arguing that truth is always socially contingent, constructed in language or discourse, variable between and even within cultures (Lyotard 1984) . One could argue that criminal trials cannot and therefore should not aspire to produce truth: 'the truth of what happened is probably unknowable' (Goodpaster 1987: 124) . While this might be consonant with the more thorough going scepticism of some modern social theory, it does not seem to be reflected in the way the official and public discourse is constructed in either the Netherlands or (Damaska, 1986; C. Brants, 2010) . That the aims of criminal procedure include discovering the substantive truth is self-evident in this context -anything less would be to overlook a priori the fundamental duality of the role of the state.
Consequently, what happens during the trial is commonly referred to (also in the CCP) as waarheidsvinding -truth-finding. Where such words are common usage, they denote what people and scholars understand criminal procedure to be about, without it ever being, or having to be, made explicit in law.
The very term 'substantive truth' assumes that there is a truth to be found, not different versions of it to be debated and from which to choose. Indeed, Dutch legal scholars regularly contrast the 'substantive truth' that is assumed to be found in the Netherlands with the 'formal' or 'procedural' truth of adversarial procedure, presuming the latter to be simply an agreement on what can be regarded as the truth -and also presuming that, in the adversarial context, it doesn't matter whether it is or not. 4 This is a misconception shaped by entrenched cultural notions of what 'the truth' should be and how it best be found. Both jurisdictions assume that the rules of criminal procedure will lead to the truth being discovered and both have the dictum that any error should be on the side of acquitting the guilty, not convicting the innocent. It is simply that there are important differences both in the way truth-finding is conceived and its relationship with other goals such as fairness in procedure.
In the adversarial tradition, the right of autonomous parties to seek out the evidence that suits their case under conditions of something approaching equality of investigative arms and the requirement that evidence be presented orally at trial and subjected to challenge by crossexamination are seen as key elements of Anglo-American due process.
This culturally specific notion of fair procedure is also thought to provide the way to the truth, because confrontation between contending arguments is thought to put a passive and impartial decision-maker in the best position to determine guilt or innocence. Whether the underlying theory of truth-finding through partisan contention is valid and whether the practical conditions required can be regularly achieved in modern jurisdictions (Jackson, 1988) , is at present not the issue. At this point we merely want to emphasize the difference between this commitment to truth-finding that emerges out of a particular notion of procedural fairness and the inquisitorial tradition, where the primary and original goal of the criminal justice system is determined by entrusting the state with the mission of directly searching for the truth. Here investigations both in the pre-trial and trial phases must be supervised by judicial figures committed to actively seeking out evidence both for and against the accused. The dossier provides continuity between pre-trial and trial phases: the results of the pre-trial investigation that has been actively supervised by the pre-trial investigating or prosecuting magistrate are placed in a dossier that becomes the basis for further judicial questioning at trial.
However, the commitment to truth-finding, be it explicit or simply 'understood' and however encapsulated procedurally, is provisional and restricted: it is not the pursuit of some absolute truth and the commitment is not unconditional. This suggests that the advantage of an active truth finding judicial figure within the inquisitorial tradition may be undermined where there is no culture of doubt and no effective institutionalized dialogue to suggest alternative hypotheses; it also raises questions about the role of the defence. The defence in the inquisitorial tradition have a limited role, traditionally seen as presenting a particular reading at trial of the evidence already collected in the dossier during the pre-trial process.
Given that the defence lawyer is an outsider to the investigation and therefore not party to the original suspicion of guilt, he or she is perhaps best placed to suggest alternative hypotheses and further investigations based on those hypotheses. The traditionally limited defence role would therefore seem to be a point of truth-finding vulnerability.
Potential vulnerabilities in criminal justice systems are not only found within the logic of the account given within a particular procedural tradition. They can also flow from a distance between the theory of truth- 
Shifting points of trust? The truth-finding police investigation in an adversarial context
The logic of adversarial fact-finding depends on some rough equality of investigative arms: otherwise the relative strength of the competing versions of reality presented at trial will reflect the inequality of investigative arms rather than the intrinsic merit of the potential evidence out there. Before the arrival of a professional police force in England and Wales in the 1830s, when most prosecutions were conducted by victims rather than the state, this may have been a less manifest structural 8 For the cases of Lawless and Sheikh see Newby (2013: 65-66) , on Dougherty and Pountley see Green (2013) problem. But it is hard to see that there could ever be equality of arms in the 20th and 21 st century contest between legal aided solicitors and teams of state investigative police with their inherently superior access to witnesses, surveillance materials, forensic science support and data bases.
One response has been to suggest that the 'cultural trust' of the system in terms of fact-finding is no longer constructed along traditional adversarial lines. We now expect the primary state actors, police and prosecutors, to behave in a quasi-judicial manner. Thus the Runciman Commission, a Royal Commission set up on the day of the release of the Birmingham 6, argued that it was the 'duty of the police to investigate fairly and thoroughly all the relevant evidence, including that which exonerates the suspect' (Runciman 1993: 9). The difficulty is that this assertion -with its implication of shifting points of cultural trust -has never been coherently set out in detailed legal duties, the Commission specifying neither the nature of the duty nor its legal source.
However there has been some judicial endorsement of principle that the police have a legal duty to seek out exculpatory evidence. In Fergus,
where the police failed, despite many requests from the prosecution, to interview alibi witnesses cited by the defendant in interview, Lord Justice usually the defence has to produce new evidence which undermines a significant element of the prosecution case against the suspect. So only by following the unexplored lead and discovering something new does this bring redress. And here it will be the 'newness' and significance of the exculpatory evidence that counts, not the failure of the police to explore it.
So there is a certain paradox here. The adversarial tradition is said to be based on distrust of the state, preferring to invest trust in the initiative of autonomous parties and the impartiality of community representatives rather than an active truth-finding magistrate. Yet here trust is placed on the state police to find the truth even in the absence of a supervising magistrate with legal powers to direct them to pursue particular lines of inquiry. Furthermore, we have a number of empirical reasons for being cautious about trusting police to pursue exculpatory evidence. There is the widespread experimental and other evidence of confirmation bias or tunnel vision as a general psychological phenomenon. More specifically, recent empirical studies of homicide investigations emphasize how the prospect of an adversarial contested trial 'permeates and foreshadows all aspects of detective decision-making in murder cases' (Brookman and Innes 2013a: 285) . Police investigative strategy is built on anticipating and shutting down lines of defence (Brookman and Innes 2013b: 297) . In particular, the moment there is a 'prime suspect' he or she becomes the dominant focus and priority for investigation. Furthermore, Innes emphasizes that SIOs are under pressure to be aware of costs of investigations: 'once the suspect was identified, there was immense pressure to discontinue previous lines of enquiry which were now seen as unproductive and costly. This is a risky strategy over the long term, as to some extent it precludes alternative hypotheses about the crime being considered' (261-2). This focus on existing hypotheses is particularly strong where officers feel under pressure to deliver (256).
This tendency to focus on a suspect and to search for incriminating evidence against him or her was evident in the famous miscarriages of justice that came to light in the 1980s. In these cases, once detectives were clear that a suspect was guilty, they felt themselves under no obligation to pursue exculpatory lines of inquiry (Sanders 1987 : 230-234, Field 1994 . This suggested the operation of adversarial assumptions in relation to the police role: it was for the defence to pursue such material. These assumptions are still evident in more recent cases. For example, in the Fergus case, in the six months between arrest and trial, the police made no attempt to trace any of the four alibi witnesses that where little or no new evidence is presented that was unavailable at trial.
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Thus the assumption is that any credible defence narratives that may exist can be (and therefore should be) presented at first instance. In practice, only defence evidence or argument that could not have been made at first instance can be the basis for appeal. This seems to reflect culturally informed but false institutional assumptions about the way the investigative process works: that advance prosecution disclosure, supported by independent active investigation by the defence, routinely provides the basis for strong defence narrative building and thus something like equality of arms. But if in many serious cases the defence in fact lack the capacity or will either to conduct active independent pretrial investigations or to make sense of the 'unused materials' disclosed by the prosecution, the cultural assumptions of the system become points of weakness rather than points of strength.
Inquisitorial truth-finding in the Netherlands
The Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure opens with the admonishment that investigation and trial shall take place only according to rules laid down in legislation. These include the Code itself, the Criminal Code, other laws governing the judiciary, the prosecution service and the police, and laws providing for procedural exceptions. This principle of legality is assumed to ensure that the state (the criminal justice authorities and courts) not only has adequate powers to investigate and punish, but is also subject to sufficient monitoring and control to prevent abuse. The latter are already present in the concept of trias politica, which gives the judiciary powers of scrutiny of executive decisions in matters of law. at which point the prosecutor should explore them. Should he consider this unnecessary or simply not do it, the defence may request that either an investigating judge or the trial court order further investigations to be conducted; whether they do so, depends on whether they deem it necessary for truth-finding purposes. Once the trial begins, the primary role of the defence is to cast doubt on the prosecution case, among other things, by prompting the judge to ask the relevant questions.
Although the trial court has an actively investigative function, the central role of the dossier means that there is only one version of the truth on paper to guide its investigation. This agenda-setting function of the dossier, assumed to contain all incriminating and exculpating evidence, places the emphasis very much on pre-trial procedure and preempts the necessity of producing all of the evidence and every witness in court. It should also be noted that the defence must ask the prosecutor to call witnesses who the prosecution have not called themselves (or ask the court to order the prosecutor to call them), and that there is no automatic right to produce one's own 'expert for the defence'. The very terms 'defence witness' and 'expert for the defence' are anomalies, for they imply partisanship. Where there are no 'parties', only 'participants', inquisitorial procedure knows only witnesses whose testimony may or may not be favourable to the defence, and experts accredited to the court, all in the service of the substantive truth.
With substantive truth the primary goal, and investigation by state officials according to law the means of achieving it, the critical point of trust hinges on the principle of legality and the professional integrity of those officials to actually behave as the law and its underlying assumptions prescribe. This is particularly important now that pre-trial investigation by the police and prosecution sets the agenda for the trial process. The lack of external controls and the often truncated nature of debate in open court hinder a truly transparent process. Even the requirement that the court give reasoned decisions, although contributing to external transparency, has its roots in scrutiny through appeal to a higher court, allowing it to examine the validity of the first decision. Trust is therefore vested in an institution that has to be assumed to police itself, if its decisions on guilt or innocence are to regarded as 'truthful'
and therefore legitimate (Jörg et al., 1996) .
Trust in all political and public institutions in the Netherlands is traditionally high (K. Brants 2013). That applies perhaps less to the police, but is particularly the case for the judiciary; the prosecution service is probably somewhere in the middle (De Keijser et al. 2004) .
Indeed, there is no small degree of (self)-satisfaction as to the workings of criminal justice with its professional judges and quasi-judicial prosecutors. The Dutch are pleased to be among the few continental systems without lay participation (an inquisitorial system by no means precludes a jury) and the public at large and even legal scholars sometimes seem convinced that an adversarial system by definition involves an ignorant jury, biased prosecution and police, and is, therefore, to be regarded as seriously handicapped in establishing the truth in criminal matters (De Roos 2000; Groenhuijsen & Knigge 2004, 107-109) .
While a deal of this prejudice is based on media reporting of sensational cases such as O.J. Simpson and, further in the past, the Birmingham Six and other miscarriages in England and Wales, it has also helped confirm the self-fulfilling belief that the Dutch system, because it could be trusted, did not produce such wrongful convictions and therefore could be trusted.
Research in 1992 (Crombag et. al., Wagenaar et al. 1993) suggested that possibly scores of miscarriages had gone unnoticed (until then only two -in 1923 and 1984 -had been officially acknowledged) and that this was, at least in part, due to the way the system itself worked. This was dismissed by practically the entire legal community as unscientific and unconvincing (e.g. Schuyt, 1992) . Such reluctance to countenance that Dutch inquisitorial process could somehow produce wrongful convictions persisted even after it became apparent that the researchers had a point. The potential strength of the system -nonpartisan pre-trial investigation, the professional integrity of those conducting it, the active investigative role of the court, elaborate rules of evidence, internal monitoring and control and the possibilities of appeal and revision (in short, its ability to police itself) -was also a potential weakness.
Vulnerabilities
The Dutch criminal justice system works, and gets it right -most of the time. Retrial by a higher appeal court probably catches a number of potential miscarriages, although there is little research to confirm this or say how many. However, the reliance on one single version of events, the result of one investigation by the police and collected by the prosecution (albeit possibly prompted by the defence) into the dossier to be verified at trial, makes the system singularly vulnerable to confirmation bias.
Paradoxically, although internal control all along the process, with each following authority checking the previous one's decisions, would seem a logical way to catch mistakes at an early stage, the same mechanism also allows those mistakes to move through the system with almost inexorable logic towards a wrongful conviction. In the miscarriages of justice that have come to light since 2002, tunnel vision and confirmation bias have been a major common factor. False confessions to the police and incorrect or misunderstood expert evidence come a close second (see i.a.: Van Koppen 2003 ; Van Koppen and Schalken, 2004; Israels, 2004; Derksen, 2006; De Ridder et al., 2008, ch. 6; 20 Van Koppen 2011; Brants, 2012) .
Such is the institutional trust in the integrity of the system and its officials that higher authorities are inclined to rely on the findings of previous decision makers and take them at face value. Case law itself instructs the court to proceed on the assumption that the dossier contains all relevant information and that the prosecutor's decision as to what is relevant is correct, unless the opposite is either glaringly obvious or can be shown by the defence. 13 However, more often than not the defence is unable to show what is missing, lacking as it does the possibility of conducting its own pre-trial investigations. In general, the lack of external controls, in particular a defence that can produce an alternative reading of the 'truth' backed up by 'alternative' evidence, compounds the problem of tunnel vision.
Although the defendant and the defence have rights such as privileged communication and access to the dossier, the emphasis on substantive truth-finding by the state and the realisation that pre-trial rights could hinder the investigation, means that the provisions granting these rights also have a proviso: ' …unless in the opinion of the investigating judge (or prosecutor, as the case may be) the interests of the investigation make the exercise of right X undesirable' (or some such formulation). Access to the full dossier is only guaranteed unconditionally from ten days before the onset of the trial; before that, the defence must try to persuade the prosecutor to allow access. This need not be a problem, but when it is, it undermines the assumption that the defence lawyer can act as a prompt to the prosecutor in matters of possible evidence favourable to the defendant. The most important steps in the development of the dossier -and the prosecutor's version of the truthtake place from the very beginning of the investigation, but this is a time when the defence has fewest opportunities to intervene.
Precisely because of this, the system is surrounded by guarantees that should compensate for the lack of autonomous defence participation and contribution, but these safeguards date from the enactment of the confirmation bias. Some have said that truth finding in a Dutch court is not focused on active investigation of whether the evidence points beyond reasonable doubt to the guilt of the defendant, but on confirmation that it does not contradict the prosecutor's assertion that the defendant is guilty (Van Koppen and Schalken, 2004) . Elaborate rules of evidence should prevent this: there must be a specified amount of corroborated, not merely circumstantial evidence and even then the court may only convict, after deliberations in chamber, if it is convinced by that evidence. There are, however, indications that judges, basing their deliberations on the dossier, look for corroborating evidence to confirm what they already think. In its written reasoning, the court need not discuss all available evidence and any residual doubt it may have had, even though judges must give a reasoned response to specific defences. Unanimity is not required, and although a career judiciary is assumed to bring the guarantee of impartiality and the rationality of the legally trained mind to the process, the fact that career judges take decisions as a matter of routine makes it all too possible that a process of group-think governs deliberations, brooking no contradiction (De Keijser et al. 2004, 36-38) .
A final point of both potential strength and weakness concerns the position of experts, who in Dutch procedure are not witnesses but simply experts to the court with no other obligation than to explain, according to professional standards of ethical conduct, what their scientific conclusions mean. This emphatically non-partisan role would seem better suited to truth-finding than experts testifying for one or other party (however much they may, in theory, be beholden to the same professional, scientific standards). However, an inquisitorial court may be just as likely as an adversarial jury to give too much weight to expert testimony and forensic evidence or to misunderstand it. In either system, neither judges nor defence lawyers are knowledgeable enough to ask the relevant scientific questions, but the absence of an expert for the defence means that the Dutch court is exclusively dependent upon its own amateur evaluation.
Moreover, it is not unknown for Dutch experts to identify, consciously or unconsciously with the prosecution case, as happened in more than one wrongful conviction.
Cases in point: Schiedam park murder 15 and Lucia de Berk
While all of the miscarriages demonstrate the risks of institutional trust in the infallibility of the Dutch system, two are particularly good examples.
The first, the Schiedam Park Murder, concerns two children, respectively killed and injured after a sexual assault. The police focussed on a passerby, a known paedophile, who confessed under protracted interrogation although he did not fit the survivor's description of the attacker and other witness statements were contradictory (though they agreed there was a bicycle). The suspect soon retracted the confession, his DNA was not found and an alibi gave him practically no time to commit the crime, yet he was convicted at first instance and then on appeal, primarily on the retracted confession and circumstantial evidence (he was in the park with a bicycle). The child's evidence was dismissed as not credible, the prosecution's (unlikely) reconstruction of the time frame and (equally unlikely) explanation of unidentified DNA on the body were accepted.
Journalists then discovered that someone else, whose DNA matched and who had a record of violent sexual offenses against children and no alibi, had confessed spontaneously to the murder in the park, a month before the Supreme Court dismissed a request for revision, there being no 'new evidence'. The convicted man was released and exonerated. And the prosecution service set up a commission of inquiry.
It found that the police had pressured the suspect to confess, disregarded evidence in his favour and, backed up by a child psychologist, vainly exerted 'inadmissible' pressure on a young and traumatized witness to make him admit to fabricating his attacker's description.
15 The facts are taken from the official report commissioned in January 2005 by the Prosecution available at www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2005/09/13/evaluatieonderzoek-in-deschiedammer-parkmoord-rapport-posthumus (last visited 4 May 2016), and from Van Koppen, 2003. Scientists at the state forensic laboratory twice expressed serious doubts about the defendant's guilt to the prosecutors because the only DNA found on both body and weapon was unidentified. They left this out of their report, nor did the prosecution tell the court or the defence. As a result, the experts were never questioned about doubts. A journalist also revealed that forensic institute scientists had been using the case during a course attended by some 200 police officers and prosecutors, to demonstrate how DNA-evidence had led to a wrongful conviction. One attendee blew the whistle and was subsequently fired for his pains. This 
Remedies and Reforms
In both of the above cases, tunnel vision and confirmation bias spread throughout the system. This had happened before, in the first wrongful conviction to come to light which was dismissed as an unfortunate incident.
18 But the public outcry about Schiedam and later Lucia de Berk (Nan, 2015, 988-991) .
As of 2012, the system of revision has also been reformed. New legislation has redefined 'new evidence.' Originally limited to facts that, had they been known at the time of the trial, would have led the court to acquit, it now includes forensic insights and evidence known at the time of trial but not recognised as significant by the tribunal of fact. Moreover, anyone considering themselves wrongfully convicted of a crime carrying a penalty of more than 12 years, may now file a request with the Procurator-General at the Supreme Court (PG) for further investigation. 
Reforms and cultural trust

England and Wales
There is strong evidence that in England and Wales defence lawyers often struggle, even in very serious cases, to conduct the autonomous proactive search for exculpatory evidence upon which a traditional concept of adversarial fact-finding depends. Even a minimal attempt to reassert the need for proactive independent defence investigation seems unlikely under current conditions of state austerity. The state has never properly financed two investigations of the same incident and seems unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future.
Rather than re-asserting traditional notions of adversarial truthfinding the tendency has been to talk in terms which seem to overlay the (Zander 2015 inquisitorial investigative processes to share responsibility for final decision-making on guilt and innocence with the Court of Appeal. An institution that receives 'evidence' outside the traditional context of oral adversarial trial simply cannot be a legitimate fact-finder. All this leaves the system with the fundamental vulnerability with which we started: if first instance decision-making is not based on a balanced contest between contending views -and we have suggested reasons for thinking that this can be a problem even in serious cases -then the system does not have the means to put that right at a later stage. In a system built on the oneshot trial you have only one shot.
The Netherlands
The title (in English) of the 'programme of improvements' that followed lawyer, has met with resistance and procrastination. Even after the right of the defence to physically attend police interrogations has been forced on the Netherlands by the European Court, the resulting legislation will restrict what they can do.
The new advisory commission ACAS is an improvement on the original temporary commission, which worked explicitly under the authority of, and through the prosecution service. However, despite calls for a totally independent investigatory commission, or even for an administrative innocence commission that would both investigate and decide on possible miscarriages of justice (Brants and Franken, 2006; Crombag et al, 2009) , the Minister has continued to reject the model of the CCRC for England and Wales as being unsuitable for an inquisitorial system. Precisely why is unclear; it is as if a totally independent commission would somehow undermine the authority of the prosecution service and the courts. The Dutch commission, despite the membership of outsiders, is effectively controlled by the PG: he decides its remit by the specificities of his request, has the new investigation opened and decides whether or not to put the case forward to the Supreme Court for revision.
However independent he may be, and whatever his professional integrity, he is still part of the system in the same way that the courts are.
It is perhaps what happens at trial that poses the greatest problem, for the courts are constitutionally outside of any external control. Their crucial role as the final evaluator of the gathering of evidence pretrial and of its probative value, is governed by the law and by professional ethics.
However, while the miscarriages demonstrate that the rules of evidence cannot prevent tunnel vision and despite enhanced training programmes, courts can still scrape together -and interpret -evidence in order to achieve a conviction. Indeed, the most recent revision case, that of the Breda Six 30 in which the referral court has reconvicted, has all of the hallmarks of this and in that sense closely resembles the case of Lucia de 30 Based on the revision decision by the Supreme Court, HR:2012:BW7190 at www.rechtspraak.nl
Berk (Deug and Stevens, 2015) .
Rules of evidence can be changed by the legislature, but that is a lengthy business. At present a project 'Modernising the Code of Criminal Procedure' is ongoing. Critics have pointed to its overwhelming concern with efficiency and with further reinforcing the primacy of pre-trial investigation above the trial. This will reduce the cost, but also the necessity of producing evidence in court and at the same time require more of the defence in the way of prompting the court to investigate (Nan, 2016, 992-993) . The latter is already an issue, as the Supreme Court has given numerous decisions which essentially force the defence into a more adversarial role without there being the corresponding partyequality and autonomy that would allow them to fulfil it properly. and formal and informal ways of thinking that shape the way they are applied in practice. This is one bilateral attempt to contribute to that understanding of different legal cultures.
Conclusion
